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I. Introduction
Structured finance innovation has changed the way ordinary people finance their
homes. This shift is especially true in Latin America, where growing housing demands
forced many countries to rethink their role in mortgage markets. In recent years, Mexico
has emerged as Latin America's leader in asset securitization, and currently boasts the
largest mortgage backed securities market in the region.
The importance of securitization is its ability to transform illiquid or risky mortgages
into marketable securities. Rather than issue debt or equity to raise capital, lenders can
bundle pools of individual mortgages into securities and sell them to investors who enjoy
fixed-rate returns. All market participants benefit from this process because it makes mar-
kets more efficient and allows lenders to increase credit to borrowers. Complex financial
structures like securitization are especially important for emerging economies because
studies show that countries with underdeveloped and ineffective financial markets have
higher rates of poverty.' The chief benefit of mortgage securitization to Latin America is
that it provides a means through which lenders can grant greater access to credit for
lower-income borrowers.
As the United States faces economic recession due to the fallout from the subprime
mortgage market, Mexico seems resilient, due in small part to U.S. investors seeking ref-
uge in the country's emerging mortgage market. Mexico remains the focus of this com-
ment because its growing mortgage-backed securities market is beginning to attract U.S.
capital and because its efforts are at the forefront of securitization developments in Latin
America. The question this comment explores is whether the U.S. subprime mess can
help Mexico avoid a housing market bubble burst.
* Rick Jordan received his J.D. from Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law in May
2008. He is an associate in the corporate/securities section of Gardere Vynne Sewell, LLP.
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Accordingly, Part II of this comment provides an overview of securitization, its advan-
tages and legal framework, as well as its development in the United States. Part III dis-
cusses the origin of the U.S. subprime crisis and its effect on the market. Part IV provides
a brief overview of Mexico's 1994 Peso Crisis, its subsequent regulatory and legal reforms
in light of increased housing demands, and ends with a look at Mexico's current secondary
mortgage market. Part V provides some thoughts on what Mexico may learn from the
U.S. subprime debacle.
H. Overview of Securitization
A. DEFINITION OF SECURITIZATION
Securitization, or structured financing, occurs when an entity (the Originator) converts
certain non-marketable assets or cash flows into a larger marketable security for resale. 2
In the typical situation, individual assets with similar characteristics, like mortgages or
auto loans, are aggregated and pooled such that investors can purchase the securities that
back those assets.3 By packaging the illiquid individual assets, the Originator creates a
liquid asset that the Originator can sell and a buyer can resell on a secondary market.4
The process generally improves the Originator's balance sheet by replacing risky assets
with cash. Purchasers of these pooled securities are mostly institutions, such as hedge
funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds. 5
B. THE SECURITIZATION OF CERTAIN ASSETS
Originators can securitize almost any asset as long as it has a predictable cash flow. 6 An
example of a predictable cash flow is a borrower's monthly mortgage payments. Residen-
tial mortgages, equipment leases, auto loans, trade receivables, credit card receivables, and
student loans, are all assets capable of being securitized and subsequently traded on a
secondary market.7 Even a rock star can securitize his or her royalty payments.8 Securi-
tized mortgages are commonly referred to as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), although
different forms of structured financing are prevalent.
C. THE ADVANTAGES OF SECURITIZATION
The underlying theory behind securitization is that companies can use certain assets to
raise funds in capital markets at a lower cost than if the company, with the risks associated
with the assets, had raised the funds through traditional methods, like equity or debt issu-
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (8th ed. 2004); Michela Scatigna, Securitisation in Latin America, BIS.
Q. REv., September 2007, at 2, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r qt0709h.pdf~noframes=l.
3. SECURTZATION, ASSET BACKED AND MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 1-7 (Ronald S. Borod ed.,
Butterworth Legal Publishers 3d ed. 1991) [hereinafter BOROD].
4. Id.
5. Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 1061, 1067-68 (1996).
6. Erica W. Stump, Securitizatians in Latin America, 8 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 195, 198 (2000).
7. Id.
8. SECURITES INDUSTRY AND FIwANCmL MARKETS ASSOCIATION, TYPES OF ASSETS THAT BACK SE-
CURIIES (2008), http://www.investinginbonds.com/leammore.aspcatid=ll&subcatid=57&id=12.
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ance.
9 The company benefits from lower capital formation costs while investors in the
securitized assets benefit by holding investments with lower risk and higher yield.' 0
Securitization also helps "complete" financial markets by creating liquid assets from ilhq-
uid assets, like turning individual mortgages into securities, and by improving the credit
quality of the structured asset." This latter point is important because a securitized asset
essentially bridges the credit quality gap between borrowers and lenders-i.e., lenders are
less interested in individual assets and more interested in pools of assets that they can
bundle and sell.12 Lenders therefore are encouraged to market similar products so that
they can package them for securitization, and will lower interest rates to entice people to
borrow.
D. EVOLUTION OF THE MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES MARKET
Congress created three entities to address deficiencies in the U.S. housing market: Gin-
nie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs). All three entities, discussed in turn, "facilitate a secondary
market for residential mortgage loans and.., enhance liquidity in such loans."'1 3 They do
this by enabling Originators to package and sell their mortgages and use the proceeds
from those sales to make more loans.
14
The first structured financing occurred in the early 1970s when the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) first guaranteed a pool of pass-through mort-
gage securities-the most common form of MBS today.' 5 Originators create pass-
through securities when they pool together assets in a trust and then sell those securities
to investors through a government agency, a private conduit, or a private placement. 16 In
the MBS pass-through transaction, the investor "purchases a fractional undivided interest
in a pool of mortgage loans, and is entitled to share in the interest income and principal
payments generated by the underlying mortgages." 17 The Originator typically continues
to service the mortgages, and a servicer will collect payments and pass-through the princi-
pal and interest to the security holder, less any fees. 18
Up until the late 1980s, Ginnie Mae and other governmental-backed mortgage securi-
ties dominated the secondary MBS market. 19 The largest player was Ginnie Mae, a
wholly-owned federal government corporation within the Department of Housing and
9. Steven L. Schwarcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZA-
TION 1-8 (Adam Ford ed., 3d ed. 2002).
10. Id.; BOROD, supra note 3.
11. Scatigna, supra note 2, at 12.
12. Id.
13. SEC, Task Force on Mortgage-Backed Securities Disclosure, Staff Report: Enhancing Disclosure in
the Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets 6 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/mort-
gagebacked.htm [hereinafter SEC Staff Report].
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7; Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 1-8.
16. BOROD, supra note 3 at 7-8; Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1-8.
17. Schwartz, supra note 9, at § 1:2.
18. BOROD, supra note 3 at 7-8; Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1-8.
19. Edward Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affected Mortgage Related Securities, 64 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 497, 500 (1989).
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Urban Development (HUD).20 I-IUD guarantees securities created by pools of mortgages
that are less than one year old and issued by the Federal Housing Administration, the
Farm Housing Administration, and the Veterans Administration.21 Ginnie Mae MBS are
fully modified pass-through securities, meaning that the security holder receives full and
timely payment of principal and interest regardless of whether the borrower pays his or
her mortgage payment.22 Thus, it is said that Ginnie Mae MBS are "backed by the full
faith and credit of the federal government."2 3
Freddie Mac is the second largest source of pass-throughs. Unlike Ginnie Mae pass-
throughs, Freddie Mac pass-throughs are not a direct obligation of the federal govern-
ment, but rather the obligation of a corporate instrumentality of the U.S.-owned Federal
Home Loan Banks and member savings and loan associations.24 The goal of Freddie Mac
MBS was originally to create a secondary market for mortgages by purchasing mortgages
from savings and loan associations. 25 Whereas Ginnie Mae guarantees a fully modified
pass-through, Freddie Mac only guarantees the timely payment of interest and the even-
tual payment of principal. 26 This pass-through is called a modified, rather than fully mod-
ified, pass-through. 27 Although Freddie Mac MBS are not backed by the full faith and
credit of the federal government, they have special authority to borrow from the U.S.
Treasury and are considered just as safe as Ginnie Mae MBS.28 Rating agencies do not
rate Freddie Mac securities. 2 9
Freddie Mac also issued the first collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) in 1983.30
A CMO is a type of mortgage-backed security that creates multiple classes of bonds that
represent claims to specific cash flows from large pools of home mortgages. 31 Each class,
called a tranche, is paid sequentially as principal payments are received from the underly-
ing mortgages. 32 The first tranche may have a life of two to three years, the second
tranche five to seven years, the third tranche ten to twelve years, and so on. 33 In addition
to different maturity dates, tranches may have different principal balances, coupon rates,
20. BOROD, supra note 3, at 1-17.
21. Pittman, stipra note 19, at 500.
22. BOROD, slipra note 3, at 1-17.
23. SEC, Mortgage-Backed Securities, June 25, 2007, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm
[hereinafter Mortgage-Backed Secuirites].
24. BOROD, supra note 3, at 1-17.
25. Freddie Mac, Our Mission, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company-profile/our-mission/in-
dex.hnl (last visited Aug. 16, 2008).
26. James E. MURRAY, The Developing National Mortgage Market: Some Reflections and Projections, 7 Real
Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 441,445-46 (1972); see also Freddie Mac, Our Role Within the Secondary Market, http://
www.freddiemae.com/corporate/company-profile/ourrole secmkt/index.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2008).
27. BOROD, supra note 3, at § 1.04.
28. Mortgage-Backed Securities, spra note 23.
29. BOROD, supra note 3, at § 1.04; see also Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac's Mortgage Securities Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/htnl/cs faq.html#6 6 (last visited September 24, 2008).
30. LELAND C. BREFDSEL, SECURTIZATRON's ROLE IN HOUSING FINANCE, IN A PRIMER ON SECURInZA-
TION 17, 22 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996).
3 1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, June 25, 2007, http://
www.sec.gov/answers/tcmos.htm [hereinafter Collateralized Mortgage Obligations].
32. Id.; see Julia P. Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to
Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. REv. 1077, 1081 (2007).
33. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Types of Bonds, http://www.investingin
bonds.com/learnmore.aspcatid=5&subcatid=17&id=35 [hereinafter Types of Bonds].
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and prepayment risks.1 4 CMOs were welcomed by investors who wanted greater flexibil-
ity in their investments, as a typical MBS only matured after ten to twelve years. 35
Another significant player in the pass-through market is Fannie Mae, also a GSE, which
began securitizing mortgages and purchasing MBS from commercial and mortgage banks
in the early 1980s. 36 Fannie Mae, like Ginnie Mae, uses a fully modified pass-through
security, meaning that it guarantees the timely payment of both principal and interest for
all securities it issues. 37 Like Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae is not supported by the full faith
and credit of the federal government, but is still considered resolute against an economic
downturn. Rating agencies do not rate Fannie Mae securities. 38
Since the 1990s, private entities have slowly taken over a majority of the MBS market in
the United States, due in part to the passage of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhance-
ment Act of 1984 (SMMEA).39 SMMEA relaxed the regulatory burdens that prevented
private sector MBS from participating in the secondary market.40 At the end of 2006,
private entities shared 54 percent of the MBS market.4 1 Whereas GSEs and Ginnie Mae
traditionally cater to borrowers with good credit, private entities like banks, savings as-
sociations, and investment banking firms, generally issue and securitize riskier mort-
gages.4 2 Also unlike GSEs, private sector MBS are not insured or guaranteed by the
federal government or any quasi-governmental entity; rather, they rely on pool insurance
and other private guarantees.4 3 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, private issuers of
MBS filled a gap by creating a secondary market for conventional mortgages and other
loans that did not qualify for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac programs. The most common
type of privately issued security is the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit
(REMIC), which the Tax Reform Act of 1986 officially sanctioned. 44 Like a CMO, the
REMIC is a multiple-class security vehicle that avoids the burden of double taxation. 45
The underlying assets of a REMIC security are either MBS or whole mortgage loans. 46
The main benefit of REMIC securities is that they allow issuers to create securities with
short, intermediate, and long-term maturities, which attracts a broader group of inves-
tors.4 7 Ginnie Mae and the GSEs have REMIC programs, each of which guarantees (to a
different degree) the timely payment of both principle and interest of each class.4 8
34. Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, supra note 31.
35. Types of Bonds, supra note 33.
36. Andrew R. Berman, "Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage"--The Use (and Misuse o) Mezzanine Loans and
Preferred Equity Investments, 11 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 76, 92 (2005); see also, Murray, supra note 26, at 437.
37. BOROD, supra note 3 at § 1.04.
38. Id.
39. Faten Sabry & Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A Priner, 1633 PRACTICING. L. INsr.
89, 91 (2007).
40. SEC Staff Report, snpra note 13, at 8.
41. Sabrv, supra note 39, at 95.
42. BOROD, supra note 3, at § 1.04; Sabry, supra note 39, at 95. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac place
caps on the amount of a loan that an individual may receive.
43. Id.
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E. LEGAL STRUCTURE OF A SECURITIZATION DEAL
In the most basic structuring of MBS, lenders package mortgage loans and sell them to
a special purpose vehicle (SPV) who owns the mortgage loans. 49 The SPV is a bank-
ruptcy-remote trust that is exempt from taxes and insulates investors from the liabilities of
the Originator.50 Acting as an underwriter, the SPV issues securities that are either
backed by, or represent interests in, the mortgages.5 1 Investors receive payments as the
borrowers make payments on their loans.5 2 When lenders pool residential home mort-
gages, a sufficiently large number are included so that "information on no one loan is
important in analyzing the pool." 53 The Originator typically services the loan, but some-
times Originators hire a servicing firm to collect the mortgagor's payments and to pass
these payments, less fees, to the SPV who in turn pays the investors.54 As discussed above,
the GSEs and Ginnie Mae guarantee the MBS, which in turn helps facilitate the secon-
dary MBS market.5 5 If mortgagors fail to make timely payments, the GSEs and Ginne
Mae make the payments due on the MBS (either in whole or in part depending on
whether it is modified or fully modified).56
This securitization process generally triggers the application of 1) the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940; 2) The Securities Act of 1933; and 3) the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
The 1940 Act requires that all investment companies register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) unless an exemption applies. Section 3(a)(1) defines an in-
vestment company as any issuer who "engage[s] primarily.., in the business of investing,
reinvesting, or trading in securities;" or one who "owns or proposes to acquire investment
securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets
(exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis." 57 The
1940 Act broadly defines "investment security" to include any security "except (A) Gov-
ernment securities, (B) securities issued by employees' securities companies, and (C) se-
curities issued by majority -owned subsidiaries of the owner which (i) are not investment
companies, and (ii) are not relying on the exception" from the definition of investment
company. 5
8
The 1940 Act lists fourteen explicit exemptions from registration for entities, including
one that explicitly exempts entities who deal in mortgages.5 9 Section 3(c)(5)(C) exempts
entities that are primarily engaged in "purchasing or otherwise acquiring mortgages and
other liens on and interests in real estate." 6 0 In addition, Rule 3a-7 specifically excludes
49. Scatigna, supra note 2, at 2.
50. Sabry, supra note 39, at 6.






57. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 at § 3 (a)(1), (3) (2006), available at http://
wwwl.law.uc.edu/CCL/InvCoAct/sec3.html [hereinafter Investment Company Act].
58. 15 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2) (2007).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 3(c) (2007).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(5)(C) (2007).
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from the definition of investment company SPVs that meet the following four conditions:
1) the SPV must issue securities whose payment depends primarily on the cash flow from
receivables; 2) the securities being issued must be non-redeemable debt securities or eq-
uity securities with debt-like characteristics that are rated at the time of their initial sale as
investment grade or better by a nationally recognized rating agency; 3) the SPV must
acquire or dispose of receivables only in accordance with the terms of the issuance agree-
ments; and 4) if the SPV issues securities that are not exempt under section 3(a)(3) of the
1933 Act, the SPV must appoint an independent trustee for those securities.
61
Since the receivables and payment streams present in a securitization deal fall within the
definition of "investment security" under the 1940 Act, the SPV must rely on an exemp-
tion to avoid registration with the SEC.62 The same is not true for GSE and Ginne Mae
MBS, however, which are completely exempt from the 1940 Act.63 Thus, it is only pri-
vate-label MBSs that are potentially subject to the registration requirements of the 1940
Act and other federal securities laws. But Rule 3a-7 has effectively exempted most private-
issue structured financings from the registration requirement. 64 Given the compliance
costs and burden of registering with the SEC, lenders structure most SPVs to fall within
Rule 3a-7. 65
The next hurdle in the MBS transaction is to determine whether to register the securi-
ties or find a registration exemption under the Securities Act. As with all registration
statements, extensive disclosure of the deal is required. As mentioned above, the charter-
ing legislation of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae generally exempt these se-
curities from registration under the Securities Act and other securities laws.66 Thus, only
non-GSE MBS, i.e., private-label MBSs, are required to find an exemption or face regis-
tration. While most private-label MBS file a registration statement, those that do not use
the transactional exemptions, which includes the section 4(2) and Rule 506 of Regulation
D.67 Section 4(2) exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering,"
and Rule 506 creates a safe harbor to this provision.68 Since any security issued pursuant
to the section 4(2) or Rule 506 exemption is a restricted security, resales are generally not
permitted unless a registration statement is in effect. Most private-label issuers use the
144A limited safe harbor for certain resales to Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs). A
QIB is an institutional investor that has at least $100 million in securities invested. In
2001, over 98 percent of private-label MBS were sold with a registration statement in
effect while the remainder were sold in Rule 144A transactions.
69
GSEs, Ginne Mae, and private-label issuers are all subject to the antifraud provisions of
federal securities laws, which include section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b)
61. Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 270 (1992), Rule 3a-7. An exception to this condition is
that non-rated securities may be sold to qualified institutional buyers and that non-rated fixed income securi-
ties may be sold to accredited investors
62. BOROD, supra note 3, at § 6.1.
63. SEC Staff Report, supra note 13, at 19.
64. BOROD, supra note 3, at § 6.1.
65. Hill, supra note 5, at 1067-68.
66. Danielle T. Berofsky, Nuts & Bolts of Financial Products 2007: Understanding the Evolving World of Capital
Market & Investment Management Products, 1589 PRACICING L. INST. 101, 193 (2007).
67. SEC Staff Report, supra note 13.
68. The Securities Act Rules 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2006).
69. SEC Staff Report, supra note 13.
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(and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder) of the Exchange Act. 70 Only the SEC uses
section 17(a) while both the SEC and private litigants may use 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to
bring antifraud suits. 71 The provisions of 17(a) and 10(b) are similar and generally pro-
hibit any person from making a false or misleading statement of material fact in the offer
or sale of MBS. 72 A statement (or omission) is material if it would cause a reasonable
investor to view it as altering the "total mix" of information made available to him or
her.7
3
III. An Explanation of the U.S. Subprine Debacle
Subprime mortgage defaults and the resulting collapse of the secondary MBS market lie
at the heart of the subprime mortgage meltdown. A subprime mortgage is a residential
loan that does not conform to the criteria for "prime" mortgages, and therefore has a
higher probability of default. 74 Whether someone is a subprime borrower depends on
their credit score, their debt service-to-income ratio, and the mortgage loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio. 75 Contrary to popular thought, the term "subprime" does not correspond to
interest rates but instead goes to the nature of the borrower. Subprime borrowers gener-
ally seek loans that do not require down payments and loans that have low monthly
payments. 76
Subprime mortgage lending greatly expanded in the mid-1990s, mainly due to innova-
tions that "reduced the costs for lenders of assessing and pricing risks." 77 Those innova-
tions included technological advances that facilitated credit scoring which made it "easier
for lenders to collect and disseminate information on the creditworthiness of prospective
borrowers. '78 In 1995, only 5 percent of mortgages were subprime; and by 2005, the
figure jumped to 20 percent.79
The increased rate of securitization during the 1980s and 1990s played a large role in
the growth of the subprime market. Lenders traditionally held mortgages on their books
until mortgagors repaid the loans; but regulatory changes in the 1980s allowed lenders to
sell mortgages to financial intermediaries with greater ease. The financial intermediaries
in turn pooled mortgages and sold the cash flows as structured securities. 80 Since securi-
tization generally increases liquidity and reduces the cost of lending, the secondary MBS
70. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77-a (2007); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (1951).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 77-a (2007); 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1 (1951).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77-a (2007); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (1951).
73. Basic Inc. v. Levinson , 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
74. John Kiff, & Paul Mills, Lessons from Subprinme Turbulence, IMF SURVEY LMAGAZINE, Aug. 23, 2007,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/RES082 3A.HTM [hereinafter Kiff article].
75. Id.
76. Christine Daleiden, Understanding Subprime Mortgages, 12 HAW. BAR J. 6, 6 (2008).
77. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 43rd An-
nual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke2007OSl7a.htm [hereinafter Bernanke's May 2007 Chicago Remarks].
78. Id.
79. Sabry, supra note 39, at 2.
80. Bernanke's May 2007 Chicago Remarks, supra note 77.
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market grew over time.81 The result was that lenders had more money to loan and be-
came more comfortable loaning to subprime borrowers.82
Products also emerged during the past decade that made credit affordable to subprime
borrowers, including interest only loans and adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs).8 3 By
2005, this access to credit resulted in incredible home ownership rates, with almost 70
percent of American families owning their homes, including minority families who were
homeowners for the first time.8 4 Subprime loans accounted for as much as 14 percent of
outstanding mortgage debt by 2006, and lenders packaged most of it into MBS, CDO, or
REMIC that they sold on the secondary market.8 5 Unwary entities, such as pension
funds, hedge funds, insurers, and municipalities, heavily invested in these subprime struc-
tured securities and, until 2007, enjoyed their expected fixed returns.8 6
A major problem loomed, however, because subprime borrowers faced higher costs of
borrowing and were more likely to default in tough times than prime borrowers. 87 So
when housing prices fell precipitously across the country in 2006-2007 at the same time
that rates on many subprime loans adjusted upward, many borrowers simply could not
afford their mortgage payments and defaulted.88 Not surprisingly, most defaults resulted
from ARMs rather than fixed-rate subprime mortgages, with some mortgages almost
doubling overnight.8 9 By June 2007, 12 percent of all ARMs borrowers defaulted, a 50
percent increase from the previous low in 2005.90
In response to the subprime debacle, the U.S. Congress, inter alia, passed the Mortgage
Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, which sought to prevent foreclosures by giving tax
relief to subprime borrowers.9 1 Whereas the tax code used to treat as income any
amounts forgiven by lenders, the 2007 Debt Relief Act allows borrowers-in 2007, 2008,
and 2009-to refinance their mortgages and exclude from income certain debt forgiveness
offered by lenders. 92
The U.S. House of Representatives passed more comprehensive legislation on Novem-
ber 15, 2007.93 The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007 (2007
Act) amends the Truth in Lending Act and generally attempts to broadly reform consumer
mortgage practices. 94 The bill is not yet law, however, because the U.S. Senate has yet to
push through a companion bill. As of this comment's submission date, the U.S. Senate
81. Id.
82. Sabry, supra note 39, at 2.
83. David Anderson, The Subprime Lending Crisis, 71 TEx. B. J. 20, 20 (2008).
84. id.; Bernanke's May 2007 Chicago Remarks, supra note 76.
85. Anderson, supra note 83, at 1.
86. Id.
87. Bernanke's May 2007 Chicago Remarks, supra note 77.
88. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks to the 2007 International Monetary Conference
(June 5, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke2007O6O5a.htm [here-
inafter Bernanke's June 2007 Cape Town Remarks].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142 (2007).
92. Id.
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has not seriously considered a similar bill, mainly because of pressure from the mortgage
industry to keep out certain provisions.
The House was mainly concerned with aggressive lending tactics that caused many low-
income borrowers to take out loans they could not afford. 95 To curb such tactics, the 2007
Act imposes a duty of care on lenders and prohibits "steering," which is the practice of
steering borrowers to high cost mortgage products, like ARMs.96 The duty of care gener-
ally requires that lenders present customers with appropriate mortgage loans, i.e., they
must look at whether the potential borrower has a reasonable ability to repay and whether
the customer will receive a "net tangible benefit" if he or she refinances the loan. 97 Lend-
ers face fines of up to three times their broker fee plus any costs if they violate their duty
of care.98 They also face potential civil actions, as the 2007 Act grants borrowers a cause
of action against both Originators and participants in the secondary market for rescission
of the loan and any costs.99 The bill additionally requires the licensure of mortgage Origi-
nators, including brokers and bank loan offers.100
There is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the 2007 Act will become law, partic-
ularly since the mortgage industry has pushed back on the bill and demanded drafting
changes. The Bush Administration has neither endorsed the bill nor indicated whether
the president will sign it into law. Lenders are especially weary of the standard of liability
for "predatory lending" because the bill seems to impose liability on lenders for "any loan
a borrower fails to pay off."10 1 Perhaps the greatest concern about the bill is that bad
lending practices already punish lenders by having them writing down their losses when
investments go south. From a lender's perspective, an additional layer of liability will only
raise interest rates for borrowers in order to hedge against potential lawsuits. 102
IV. Rise of the Secondary MBS Market in Mexico
A. INTRODUCTION
Latin America has traditionally been unable to finance homes because a combination of
"inflation, social instability, and currency weakness" 103 has resulted in high interest rates
for borrowers. 104 In the mid to late 1990s, only one in five homes carried a mortgage, 05
95. Mortgage Reform Bill Advances in the House, AM. BKRP. INST. J. Dec. 2007/Jan. 2008, available at http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5 3 70/is_200712/ain21300140? tag=content;coll.
96. 2007 Act, supra note 91, at § 103.
97. Id. at § 202.
98. Id.
99. Id. at § 204. The current version of the bill creates a safe harbor for assignees and securitizers who are
able to cure the defect by making the loan conform to the required standard within ninety days. See id. at
§ 205.
100. Id. at § 104.
101. Yaron Brook, Predatory Lending, FORBES, Dec. 4, 2007, availableat http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/03/
predatory-business-act-oped-cx yb_1204predatory.html.
102. Id.
103. Many banks refused to give mortgage loans in local currencies because of the risk of having to reim-
burse a loan in dollars if the local currency deflated. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Ed Ruta Hacia El Desarrollo:
The Emerging Secondary Mortgage Market in Latin America, 34 GEO. WASH. INrr'L L. REv. 257, at 259 (2002).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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and the typical interest rate usually fluctuated between 15 and 20 percent, forcing most
people to finance homes with cash or build them by hand. 10 6 While U.S. borrowers have
enjoyed incredible access to credit, Latin American borrowers-and Mexicans until re-
cently-generally could not afford the long-term debt needed to finance a home. Securi-
tization offers great benefits to Latin America because it tends to "mitigate sovereign risk,
improve the resilience of markets in periods of stress, and provide a source of funding for
housing system[s]."107
The importance of this comment lies in the fact that during the last decade, Latin
America-and Mexico in particular-has experienced increased housing demands that
have caused the region to encourage securitization and the development of secondary
markets. 1 8 Efficient MBS markets will not only change the financing landscape of Latin
America, but will also attract more foreign capital as the United States sinks into reces-
sion. Because Mexico arguably leads these efforts, and boasts the largest residential MBS
market in Latin America, it is the focus of this comment.' 09 The remainder of this com-
ment provides an overview of Mexico's housing demands, the regulatory environment
necessitated by the 1994 Peso Crisis that halted lending in the 1990s, the emerging MBS
market, and some concluding thoughts on whether Mexico's MBS market will stay strong
in light of the U.S. subprime debacle.
B. MEXICO'S HOUSING DEMAND
Although Mexico has seen a real estate boom in the past six years, it cannot seem to
build houses fast enough.11( The strength of Mexico's housing demand is evidenced by
the fact that in 2006, housing construction represented almost 3 percent of the country's
gross domestic product, which is roughly the same as Mexico's manufacturing leader-the
auto industry."' In addition, the construction sector was the most profitable sector in
106. Id. at 262.
107. Scatigna, supra note 2, at 5.
108. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, Financial Update (First Quarter 2004): Creating a Secon-
dary Mortgage Market in Mexico, available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfmn?objectid=e832daf8-0e12-
537c-c41e9c3d915b2b19&method=display [hereinafter Atlanta Federal Reserve Mexico Article]; Poindexter,
supra note 103, at 259; Otaviano Canuto, Securitization of Latin America: Advantages of Latecomers, LATIN
AMERICA EcOMONITOR, Oct. 1, 2007, http://Aww.rgemonitor.com/latam-monitor/331/securitization in_
latin americaadvantagesoflatecomers [hereinafter Canuto]; FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAs, Beyond
the Border: Mexico Emerges from 10-Year Credit Clump, 3 Southwest Economy (2005), http://www.dallasfed.
org/research/swe/2005/sweO503d.honl (staring "Despite a slight rise in interest rates over the second half of
the year, Mexico's securitization market almost quadrupled in 2004, making it the top such market in Latin
America.") [hereinafter Dallas Federal Reserve Mexico Article] .
109. Dallas Federal Reserve Mexico Article, supra note 108. That Mexico is emerging as a market leader is
evidenced in part by the over $300 million that the US's largest public pension fund, the California Public
Employees Retirement System, has invested in Mexican structured finance deals since the recent US market
slide. See Theresa Bradley, Mexico Enjoys a Housing Boom, AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN, Feb. 17, 2008,
available at http://banderasnews.com/O802/nz-mexboom.htm. As of 2007, Mexico was number one in asset
securitization in Latin America, with over six and a half billion in US dollars securitized. See Caunto, supra
note 108.
110. Bradley, supra note 109.
111. THE WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, The War between Banks and 'Sofoles'
Propels Mexican Real Estate, Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfn?fa=viewfeature&
language=english&id= 1104 [hereinafter Wharton].
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2005, with construction firms listed on the Mexican stock exchange enjoying a 44 percent
increase over previous annual returns.' 2
Yet, despite the growth of construction companies, demand for housing remains high,
with over six million households without adequate dwellings.ii 3 "President Felipe Calde-
ron has set a national goal of a million new mortgages a year by 2010."114 When Mexico
privatized its banks in the early 1990s, there was rapid growth in ability of individuals to
finance homes-but when the Peso Crisis of 1994 came about, interest rates skyrocketed,
and a record number of individuals defaulted on their mortgage loans." 5 With such a
negative experience during this period, it took y~ars for Mexicans to put faith in private
banks. Instead of relying on mortgages, Mexicans went back to their old ways, and either
bought houses with cash or built them by hand." 6 The looming economic recession in
the United States might cause Mexican immigrants to lose their jobs and return to Mex-
ico, creating an even larger housing demand." 7 Harsh U.S. immigration laws are another
factor that might swell the growing demand for housing in Mexico." 8
C. MExIco's REGULATORY FRAMEwoRK
Like in the United States where droves of people bought homes during the last decade,
Mexico has rebounded from its 1990s economic woes and now boasts one of the strongest
housing sectors in Latin America. As the United States sinks into recession because of the
subprime debacle, Mexico's mortgage market not only seems resilient but has the poten-
tial to shape regulatory reforms throughout Latin America. An adequate discussion of
Mexico's current mortgage situation must begin with a primer on the Mexican economic
woes of the 1990s.
The well-documented 1994 Peso Crisis devastated Mexico's economy for close to a
decade. Before 1994, the Mexican economy showed healthy growth with the emergence
of market-oriented institutions and other reforms, such as the abolition of protectionist
trade barriers and the restructuring of foreign debt." 9 Just before the crash, Mexico's
inflation was down to single digits for the first time in over twenty years, and foreign
investments were pouring into the economy. 120 The once-nationalized banking sector
became privatized, and credit became widely available, resulting in the rapid growth of
mortgage loans in the early 1990s. 121 The good times quickly ended with the 1994 Peso
Crisis as borrowers defaulted in record numbers causing the near collapse of the banking
112. Id.
113. Bradley, supra note 109.
114. Id.
115. INT'L MONtP-TAR', FUND, Mexico: Selected Issues 41 (Dec. 2007), available at http://%ww.iif.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/scr/2007/crO7378.pdf [hereinafter IMF Mexico Article].
116. Bradley, supra note 109.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Francisco Gil-Diaz, The Origins of Mexico's 1994 Financial Crisis, 17 CATO J., Winter 1998, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjl 7n3-14.html; see also Joseph A. Whitt, The Mexican Peso Crises, Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, EcoNoM\oic REVIEW, Winter 1996, available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelega-
cydocs/J..whi81 I.pdf.
120. Diaz, sipra note 119.
121. Id.
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sector. 122 Although commentators disagree on the precise cause of the 1994 Peso Crisis
(e.g., some blame the North American Free Trade Agreement), one of the greatest eco-
nomic crashes of modern times hit Mexico in 1994, leading to the severe devaluation of
Mexico's currency, the peso, which lost half of its value in less than three months.
123
On the housing sector side, the recession that emerged after the devaluation caused the
real estate market to collapse as private capital quickly left the housing market. 124 Because
lenders had indexed most mortgages to both inflation and minimum wage, the peso depre-
ciated interest rates soared. 125 The economy's collapse caused unemployment to sky-
rocket, meaning that people could not afford their mortgage payments.' 26 About 80
percent of borrowers defaulted on their mortgages while banks' portfolios lost nearly 50
percent of their value. 127 Banks abruptly halted their lending and effectively withdrew
from the mortgage market. 128 Because of the need for housing (and perhaps because of
the negative experience Mexicans had with private banks), 129 the Mexican government had
to step up the role of governmental institutions. 1
30
The rest of this section discusses how the Mexican Government used three different
entities-SHF, INFONAVIT, and SOFOLES-to deal with the growing housing de-
mand and the departure of private banks from lending to the lower-income sector. Also
included is a discussion of Mexico's important legal developments, an explanation of how
private banks returned to lending, and an overview of Mexico's emerging MBS market.
D. SHF
As discussed above, a MBS market cannot develop without government guarantees.
131
In the United States, Ginnie Mae and the GSEs guarantee timely payment (either
through a fully modified or modified guarantee) of mortgages to investors in case the
borrower is unable to make a payment. The most important MBS development in Mexico
was the creation of Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, S.N.C., (SHF), a national development
bank, in 2001.132 Although the Mexican government did not explicitly model SHF after
the U.S.'s GSEs or Ginne Mae, its purpose is similar as it hopes to "promote the con-
122. IMF Mexico Article, supra note 115, at 41.
123. Dallas Federal Reserve Mexico Article, supra note 108.
124. Wharton, supra note 111; JoINT CEN-ER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNiV. RSiTY, The
State of Mexico's Housing (2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/internationalV
som2004.pdf [hereinafter June 2004 Harvard Study].
125. Id.
126. Id.; see also Bradley, supra note 109.
127. June 2004 Harvard Study, supra note 124.
128. Wharton, supra note 111; see also Natalie Pickering, The Mexico Mortgage Boom, Bust and Bail Out:
Determinants of Borrower Default and Loan Restructure After the 199Y Currency Crisis, JOLNT CEN-FER FOR
HOUsINc, STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, April 2000, available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publica-
tions/internationa/pickeringw0-3.pdf [hereinafter April 2000 Harvard Study].
129. See Wharton, supra note 111.
130. Id.; see also Natalie Pickering, The SOFOLES: Niche Lending or New Leaders in the Mexican Mortgage
Market, JoiNT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNTWERSFTY, May 2000, available at http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/intemational/pickering-wOO-2.pdf [hereinafter May 2000 Harvard
Study].
131. Scatigna, supra note 2, at 75.
132. SOCIEDAD HIPOTECARIA FEDERAL, S.N.C. , About SHF, available in English at, http://translate.google.
com/translatehl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.shf.gob.nix/sobreshf.html&sa=&oi=translate&resnum= 1 &ct=re-
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struction and purchase of housing" by aiding the development of an efficient secondary
MBS market.133 SHF is the only Mexican governmental entity whose explicit purpose is
to promote a secondary MSE market. 134
Like the U.S. GSEs, SHF puts the "'full faith and credit' of [the] federal government"
behind mortgages, but unlike the U.S. GSEs, SHF has an expiration date-2013. 35 SHF
does not lend directly to the public,136 rather, it simply guarantees the timely payment of
mortgages as follows: if a mortgage is six months late, SHF pays to the lender between 25
and 75 percent of the outstanding balance of the mortgage loan, plus interest, and any
unpaid servicer and insurance fees.137 It is important to note, however, that SHF will only
guarantee mortgages that conform to specific criteria, which include certain debt-to-in-
come and loan-to-value requirements, as well as reporting obligations. 138
SHF accomplishes its goal by hedging the risk of dramatic interest rate increases and
promoting the securitization of mortgage portfolios and mortgage origination by enhanc-
ing credit. 39 Like the U.S.'s GSEs, SHF has several different programs in which financial
intermediaries may participate, and the result is that banks can offer mortgage loans with
lower interest rates. 140 With time, SHF's guarantee will create a larger demand for MBS.
As banks package and sell their rnhortgages, the extra cash in hand will allow them to issue
more mortgages.
E. INFONAVIT
Along with SHF, the other major mortgage lender in Mexico is Instituto del Fondo
Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores, or the National Workers' Housing Fund
Institute (INFONAVIT),'4' a government agency created in 1972. INFONAVIT played
a large role in the housing sector following the 1994 Peso Crisis by funding the construc-
tion of affordable housing for workers. 142 INFONAVIT has a double mandate of "pro-
viding individual pension funds for private sector employees in Mexico" and granting
mortgages to those who qualify. 143 To support its pension fund, INFONAVIT instituted
sult&prev=/search%3Fq%3DSobre%2BSHF%26hl%3Den. Translated, SHF means the "Federal Mortgage
Society."
133. Id.
134. Carlos Aiza Haddad, The Securitization of Assets in Mexico, 7 U.S.-MEx. LJ. 141, 143 (1999); Brigitte
Posch & Philip Kibel, Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal: Does the Mortgage Partial Guarantee Work?-The Proof is in
the Pudding, STRUCTURFD FINANCE SPECIAL REPORT, MooDy's INV. SERV. (July 26, 2002), available at
http://www.nadaw.com/seminar/doc37.pdf [hereinafter Special Report].
135. WORLD BANK, Housing Finance in Mexico: Evolution, Strategy and Challenges Ahead, Powerpoint Presen-
tation, March 2006 (on file with author) [World Bank Powerpoint].
136. Id.
137. Special Report, supra note 134.
138. Id. By creating the said criteria, SHF effectively has standardized the mortgage market.
139. Id.
140. Vicente Grau and Sergio Chagoya, Securitization of Mortgage Loans in Mexico, 1 U.S.-MEx. L. REv. 3, 4
(2007).
141. Melissa Hall, Foreigners Funding the Future: Investment Opportunities in Mexico's Privatized Pension Sys-
tem, 34 T~x. INT'L LJ. 151, 172(1999).
142. Id.; Dallas Federal Reserve Mexico Article Two, supra note 1.
143. AMBAC, Mexico's Largest Mortgage Lender Completes First Guaranteed RMBS Transaction, Oct. 3,2007,
http://www.ambac.com/pdfs/Deals/Infonavit.pdf.
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a mandatory 5 percent payroll deduction for all workers.144 INFONAVIT makes pay-
ments on its MBSs from " automatic deductions from worker's wages," which helps keep
the delinquency rate down. 145 As of 2006, INFONAVIT held loans totaling over forty
billion, "the largest mortgage portfolio in Latin America." 146
F. SOFOLES
In 1993 as part of NAFTA, 147 the Mexican Government authorized Sociedades
Financieras de Objeto Limitado (SOFOLES), which are limited purpose financial compa-
nies equivalent to U.S. mortgage houses. 148 Also called non-bank banks, the SOFOLES
obtain licenses from the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit that allow them to lend
to particular sectors, including the housing, consumer, small business, and auto finance
markets.149 On the housing side, the SOFOLES function mostly as mortgage companies
that both originate and service mortgages to the low-income segment of the mortgage
market.'50 As non-deposit entities, the SOFOLES fund their loans through commercial
or development bank loans (including SHF),15 private investors, or the Mexican stock
markets.' 52 In 2007, SHF funded almost 45 percent of SOFOLES' loans.'5 3
Getting SOFOLES involved in mortgage lending was important to the Mexican Gov-
ernment, particularly after it became virtually impossible for the low-income sector to
borrow luring the mid-1990s.' 54 By 1996, only 15 percent of households were eligible for
private bank mortgages.' 55 The reason that banks only lent to high incomes individuals
has its roots in Mexico's nationalization of the banking system in 1982. When the Gov-
ernment took over the banks, they maintained a certain amount of "social interest loans,"
typically ranging from 3 to 6 percent of the bank's mortgage portfolio.156 These so-called
"social interest loans," funded in part by Fondo de Operacion y Financiamiento Bancario
a la Vivienda (FOVI), a government trust within the central bank designed to promote
144. Dallas Federal Reserve Mexico Article Two, supra note 1.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. ASOCIACION MEXICANA DE SOCIEDADES FINANCIERAS DE OBJETO LIMITADO, A.C., available in En-
glish at http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.esmas.com/emprendedores/
pymesint/proveedores/400855.htm&sa=X&oi=transate&resnum=4&ct=resut&prev=/search% 3Fq% 3
DSociedades%2BFinancieras%2Bde%2BObjeto%2BLimitado%2B%26hl% 3Den [hereinafter AMSFOL].
148. See Special Report, supra note 134; May 2000 Harvard Study, supra note 130. As of 2005, the Mexican
Government had authorized forty-eight SOFOLES entities. AMSFOL, supra note 147.
149. INT'L MONETARY FUND, Mexico: Financial System Stability Assessment Update October, 13 2006, availa-
ble at http://www.imf.org/extemallpubs/ft/scr/2006/crO63 50.pdf; Wharton, supra note I11.
150. May 2000 Harvard Study, supra note 130.
151. Including SHF discussed infra.
152. Ana Maria Rosas Pena, New Aliadas of SMEs, available in Englisb at http://translate.google.com/translate
?hl=en&sl=es&u=http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/02/14/004nlsec.html&sa=&oi=translate&resnum=9&
ct=result&prev=/search% 3Fq% 3DSociedades%2BFinancieras%2Bde%2BObjeto%2BLimitado%2 B%26
hl%3Den.
153. FITcH RATINGS MEoXICAN MORTGAGE COMPANIES 4, Mar. 6, 2008, available at http://www.fitchrat-
ings.com/corporate/login/setSessionVars.cfm?userldParam=rikk03&SCRIPT-NAME=/corporate/reports/
report-frame.cfn&QUERY-STRLNG=rpt-id=377542&sectorflag=2 I &marketsector= I &detail=.
154. May 2000 Harvard Study, supra note 130, at 3.
155. Id. at 6.
156. Id. at 7.
FALL 2008
1196 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
lower-income housing, were not required after the liberalization of the banks in late
1980s. 15 7 Since private banks no longer had to participate in the FOVI "social interest
loans" program, they did not, leaving nearly 100 percent of their mortgage portfolios (if
they had such portfolios) to the upper-income brackets. 58 When the SOFOLES
emerged in the mid-1990s, using FOVI funds, they filled gap that private banks created
when they halted participation in FOVI's "social interest loan" program.
G. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
As discussed above, the creation of a trust or SPV is a necessary component of a U.S.
securitization deal, as the SPV acts as both an underwriter and insulator from bankruptcy.
Mexicans also use bankruptcy-remote SPVs'5 9 that issue so-called certificados bursdtilesfi-
duciaries and hold the pooled mortgage loans after securitization.
160
Before 2005, the biggest impediment to securitization deals in Mexico was trust law.
The old system prevented trusts from issuing debt, which meant that the dealmaker issued
the assets through securities, with a governmental agency certifying that the pooled assets
were equal to the MBS.161 In December 2005, the Mexicans instituted a new Securities
Market Law that authorized the certificados bursdtilesfiduciarios (exchange-traded trust cer-
tificates) and permitted the trust to issue these securities for the first time. 62 The Securi-
ties Market Law made the requirements for the issue of certificados bursdtiles fiduciaries
more flexible 163 by eliminating the previous impediments to issuing debt securities.' 64 To-
day, the use of such trusts "has become the means par excellence" for the securitization of
mortgage loans. 165
Another impediment to securitization was that Mexican law required the notarization
and subsequent recording of mortgages with the Public Registry of Property.' 6 6 This
effectively prevented any assignment of mortgages (i.e, securitization) that did not utilize a
notary and inform the borrower. To help develop its MBS market, Mexico passed a new
law that allows the assignment of mortgages without notice to the debtors and without use
of a notary public. 16 7
Mexican states also modified their foreclosure laws to allow banks to initiate a foreclo-
sure proceeding within two months of a borrower's default or discovery of a fraud.' 68 The
ability of lenders to foreclose mortgages in default is crucial to the success of a secondary
market because it gives investors some certainty that certain loans will not completely
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Under Mexican law, a financial intermediary must act as the trustee. See Alfonso Castro Diaz, Facts are
Meaningless, IN1'L FIN. L. REFW, 2007, available at http://www.iflr.com/?Page=17&ISS=23918&SID=
696635 [hereinafter Int'l Law Review Article].
160. Id.
161. Stump, supra note 6, at 204; Scatigna, supra note 2, at 75.
162. Int'l Law Review Article, supra note 159.
163. Grau, sutpra note 140, at 4.
164. Int'l Law Review Article, supra note 159.
165. Grau, supra note 140, at 4.
166. Poindexter, supra note 103, at 270.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 271.
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default. But a foreclosure must be quick, and the new law accomplishes this by putting a
foreclosure proceeding atop a court's docket. 69
H. REEMERGENCE OF THE PRIVATE BANKs EN 2004
Private banks reemerged slowly after the 1994 Peso Crisis, and it was not until 2004
that these banks actively lent to the masses. The process of reintroducing private banks to
borrowers was slow, but a new regulatory framework governing credit bureau operations
helped-the new regulations improved the timeliness and accurateness of a potential bor-
rower's creditworthiness. This improvement gave banks greater comfort in lending to
lower-income individuals. 170
Recent trends show that private banks and the SOFOLES are slowly catching up with
the securitization rates of the government issued securities, and may surpass them soon.
169. Id.
170. Dallas Federal Reserve Mexico Article Two, slipra note 1.
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